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ABSTRACT 
While all industries that handle valuable data have been subject to increasing levels of cyber 
attack, there is a set of inter-related factors in the law firm cyber security ecosystem that 
makes such firms more susceptible to attack and also serves to prevent them from taking 
action to counteract attack vulnerability. As a result of the inter-related external and in-
ternal factors affecting law firm cyber security, the human element of firm security infra-
structure has been neglected, thereby making humans, at once law firms’ greatest asset, 
their main cyber security weakness. 1There has been some movement of late, and regulators 
and clients alike are right to demand law firms do more to improve their cyber security 
posture.2 However, much of the scrutiny to which their conduct has been subjected has 
tended to overlook the complexities of the law firm cyber security quagmire, and unless 
these issues are addressed in the context of a potential solution, meaningful change is not 
	
		
1  Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, The Relational Infrastructure of Law Firm Culture and Regulation: The Exag-
gerated Death of Big Law, 42 HOFSTRA L. REVIEW, 109 (2013). 
2  Julie Sobowale, Law firms must manage cybersecurity risks, American Bar Association Journal (Mar. 29, 2018, 
12:37 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/managing_cybersecurity_risk; See also: McNerney, 
Michael & Emilian Papadopoulos, Hacker's Delight: Law Firm Risk and Liability in the Cyber Age, AMERI-
CAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 62, 1243-1272 (2013). 
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likely. Part 1 of this paper outlines the current threat landscape and details the integral 
role of human error in successful cyber breaches before turning to discuss recent cyber secu-
rity incidents involving law firms. In Part 2, we analyse elements of law firm short-termism 
and the underregulation of law firm cyber security conduct and how these, when combined, 
play a key role in shaping law firm cyber security posture. Finally, in Part 3 we outline a 
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I. PART 1 – THE CURRENT THREAT LANDSCAPE 
 
A. Attacks on the rise 
 
In recent years, cyber attacks have been growing in frequency, intensity and complexity. 
Notable examples of breaches include household names such as Equifax, Uber, Yahoo!, 
Sony, Netflix, JP Morgan, Target, Anthem, and Epsilon3, as well as prominent interna-
tional sports stars, politicians, members of the British monarchy and Russian oligarchy.4 
With a more diverse range of perpetrators than ever before, including (amongst others) 
nation states, hacktivists, and individual private contractors, and a wider variety of attacks 
ranging from denial-of-service to ransomware, 2017 may just be the year in which the 
world reached peak cyber attack. An inordinate number of breaches were recorded - some 
on a very public stage, particularly WannaCry and Petya - which affected government de-
partments, international law firms and brought the UK National Health Service to a 
standstill. Initial reports of cyber attacks this year suggest that 2018 has continued in much 
the same vein, with high profile and diverse breaches affecting everything from the market 
for cryptocurrencies to the 2018 Winter Olympic Games in Pyeongchang, South Korea. 
By one count, in January alone, over 7 million successful breaches were recorded.5 
 
B. Consequences of breach 
 
It is clear that cyber attacks have very real practical consequences for organizations. Re-
ports of the WannaCry and Petya incidents make for almost apocalyptic reading: “ship-
ping containers could not be loaded, lawyers were locked out of their computers and a 
production line was prevented from churning out chocolates”.6 Another account begins 
“[in Britain], doctors could neither access their patients’ files nor make appointments to 
see those patients. In Russia, hundreds of the interior ministry’s workers sat idle. In 




3  Taylor Armerding, The 17 biggest data breaches of the 21st century, CSO (Mar. 29, 2018, 12:26 PM), 
https://www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/data-breach/the-biggest-data-breaches-of-the-21st-cen-
tury.html. 
4  ICIJ Investigation, Paradise Papers: Secrete of the global elite, International Consortium of Investigative Jour-
nalistst (Mar. 29, 2018, 12:29 PM), https://www.icij.org/investigations/paradise-papers/. 
5  Lewis Morgan, List of data breaches and cyber attacks in January 2018, IT Governance (Mar. 29, 2018, 12:31 
PM), https://www.itgovernance.co.uk/blog/list-of-data-breaches-and-cyber-attacks-in-january-201-2/. 
6  Hannah Kuchler, Cost of cyber crime rises rapidly as attacks increase, Financial Times (Mar. 29, 2018, 12:31 PM), 
https://www.ft.com/content/56dae748-af79-11e7-8076-0a4bdda92ca2. 
7  The Economist Group Limited, A large-scale cyber-attack highlights the structural dilemma of the NSA, The 
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The key concern for most organizations is the financial cost of cyber breaches. At its cur-
rent rate, the cost of breaches to businesses worldwide is expected to reach $6 trillion by 
2021.8 Such financial consequences for organizations usually manifest themselves by way 
of regulatory action and/or market response. Take for example the Epsilon breach, which 
was disclosed to shareholders on 30 March 2011. Here, one of United States’ most promi-
nent email service providers succumbed to a spearphishing attack9 and the email addresses 
of its clients were obtained by hackers who in-turn subjected these organizations to a sus-
tained spearphishing campaign consisting of an estimated 6 billion spam emails. The es-
timated cost of the breach to Epsilon emanating from, amongst other factors, reputa-
tional damage suffered, when last calculated was projected to top $4 billion.10 Addition-
ally, Uber are currently under investigation and facing the prospect of hefty fines from 
the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) in the UK as well as equivalent regulatory 
bodies in the United States and Italy for their handling of a data breach in 2016. Instead 
of reporting a breach, which compromised the personal information of 57 million drivers 
and customers, the company paid a ransom to hackers and the company proceeded to 
cover up the incident.11 
 
Many professional services organisations are now turning to cyber risk insurance as a 
means of lessening the inevitable financial damage caused by a potential breach. The Fi-
nancial Times notes that the London insurance market, the largest in the world, saw a 
50% rise in the number of companies and individuals taking out cyber risk insurance pol-
icies in 2016. It estimates that the current total written premium amount of $2.5 billion 
could reach $20 billion by 2025.12 Due in-part to the ever-increasing quantity and com-
plexity of attacks, cyber risk insurance is typified by high cost and complex coverage 
terms.13 Yet, the lack of data about cyber risks poses a problem of coverage for those seek-
ing or currently holding such policies and means that current cyber risk policies are both 
	
		
8  The Editors at Cybersecurity Ventures, Cybercrime Report, Cybersecurity Ventures (Mar. 29, 2018, 12:35 PM), 
https://cybersecurityventures.com/hackerpocalypse-cybercrime-report-2016/. 
9  Spearphishing is an email or electronic communications scam targeted towards a specific individual, organiza-
tion or business. Although often intended to steal data for malicious purposes, cybercriminals may also intend 
to install malware on a targeted user’s computer - What is Spear Phishing?, Kaspersky (Mar. 29, 2018, 02:59 
PM) https://www.kaspersky.co.uk/resource-center/definitions/spear-phishing. 
10  Ross Kerber & Brenton Cordeiro, Analysis: Alliance Data may face high Epsilon breach costs, Reuters (Mar. 
29, 2018, 12:45 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-alliance-epsilon-costs/analysis-alliance-data-may-
face-high-epsilon-breach-costs-idUSTRE7393E320110411. 
11  Financial Times Reporters, Uber faces investigations by regulators over massive data breach, Financial Times 
(Mar. 29, 2018, 12:50 PM), https://www.ft.com/content/20d98370-cf68-11e7-9dbb-291a884dd8c6. 
12  Madhumita Murgia & Oliver Ralph, Boom in cyber attack insurance predicted to gather pace, Financial Times 
(Mar. 29, 2018, 12:51 PM), https://www.ft.com/content/a767e518-c91e-11e6-8f29-9445cac8966f. 
13  Sean B. Cooney, Untangling the Mystery of Cybersecurity Insurance, Keesal, Young & Logan (Mar. 29, 2018, 
12:31 PM), http://www.kyl.com/2017/02/01/untangling-the-mystery-of-cybersecurity-insurance/ originally 
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increasingly expensive and inadequate for many organisations’ needs. A report from the 
SANS Institute highlights the coverage gaps caused by uncertainty in the buying and un-
derwriting relationship between information security personnel (InfoSec personnel) 
from organisations and insurers. Gaps include: i) technology – InfoSec personnel have a 
diverse understanding of risk and think in terms of eliminating threats and vulnerabilities 
by way of policies and programmes, while insurers see risk as the financial loss to a firm 
from a breach; (ii) assessment – insurers prefer quantitative assessment models, while only 
25% InfoSec personnel opt for quantitative models when measuring and benchmarking 
defences; (iii) communication – gaps in (i) and (ii) have created communication gaps be-
tween the InfoSec personnel and the insurer, the InfoSec personnel and risk manager and 
between the insurer and brokers; and (iv) investment – lack of transparency in underwrit-
ing criteria and complex terminology in written policies has resulted in misaligned invest-
ment by buyers and the rejection of claims. 14 
 
C. Human behavior as an aspect oy cyber security 
 
One defining feature of organisational cyber security that has emerged in recent years is 
that the weakest link in defence infrastructure is humans. When perimeter software de-
fences, such as firewalls, are circumvented, the next – and often last – layer of defence is 
made up of the employees. This places a premium on their ability to detect and appropri-
ately deal with the attack. Not surprisingly, because the implementation of software pro-
tection - when compared with the changing of employee behaviour toward good cyber 
security - is easier to do, organizations have tended to focus on software protections as a 
means of defence in the hope of insulating employees from attack. However, software 
protections carry issues of their own. They are dated by their very nature, and so once 
rolled out, hackers will set to work developing programmes to hone in on perceived weak-
nesses. Furthermore, there is evidence of human weakness in the coding of such software 
protections. A study produced by researchers at the University of Florida, Pennsylvania 
State University and NYU, puts forward that developers have a heuristics-based decision-
making process, which is a computational model of solving problems without considering 
all the information available. Software vulnerabilities can be explained as elements left out 








14  Barbara Filkins, Bridging the Insurance/InfoSec Gap: The SANS 2016 Cyber Insurance Survey, SANS Institute 
(Mar. 29, 2018, 12:57 PM), https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/bridging-insurance-in-
fosec-gap-2016-cyber-insurance-survey-37062. 
15  Justin Cappos, Nicole Morin, Daniela Oliveira, Marissa Rosenthal, Martin K.-C Yeh., & Yanyan Zhuang, It's 
the Psychology Stupid: How Heuristics Explain Software Vulnerabilities and How Priming can Illuminate De-
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While software protections are a crucial part of any organization’s cyber defence infra-
structure, the above vulnerability notwithstanding, they are only a part. A part which is 
breached from time to time, and once hackers are inside these perimeter defences, un-
skilled and unaware employees are powerless to stop them. The IBM Security Intelligence 
Index 2014 noted that 95% of all cyber breaches involve some element of human error.16 
This data was backed up by the Verizon 2016 Data Breach Investigations Report, which 
also gave examples of how human error manifests itself in a cyber breach.17 The report 
notes that basic cyber defences, policies and defence action plans are sorely lacking within 
organizations; 63% of attacks involve the use of weak, default or stolen passwords; and 
that a sizeable portion of attacks exploit known vulnerabilities that the target has not 
patched, despite the patch being available to the user. The report notes that the top 10 
known vulnerabilities accounted for 85% of successful breaches. 18 
 
We have seen that the dominant – and most successful – means of exploiting human 
weakness in an organization is by way of social engineering attacks (those which involve 
psychological deception and manipulation) such as spearphishing. As computer security 
specialist, Bruce Schneier commented back in 2000, “only amateurs attack machines; pro-
fessionals target people”.19 The Symantec 2017 Internet Security Threat Report notes that 
in 2016, Business Email Correspondence (BEC) spearphishing emails targeted over 400 
organizations per-day and had yielded over $3 billion in stolen information in the years 
2013 to 2015.20 Many of the most prominent data breaches in recent years have relied on 
this very technique. These include, as mentioned above, the Panama and Paradise Papers 
hacks of law firms Mossack Fonseca and Appleby respectively. Perhaps one of the best 
examples of the simplicity of spearphishing and the cataclysmic effect it can have should 
it be successful, is the Sony hack from late 2015. In the run up to the attack, Sony had been 
promoting its upcoming feature film ‘The Interview’, a comedy parodying North Korean 
leader Kim Jong Un and a plot by American agents to assassinate him. North Korea, in-
furiated by this apparent show of disrespect, commissioned a hacking group to infiltrate 
Sony’s network in the lead up to the film’s release, as confirmed by the FBI.21 However, 
the hackers did not attack the organization’s perimeter defences, such as firewalls. Instead, 
	
		
16  IBM Security Services 2014 Cyber Security Intelligence Index, IBM Global Technology Services (Mar. 29, 2018, 
12:57 PM), https://media.scmagazine.com/documents/82/ibm_cyber_security_intelligenc_20450.pdf. 
17  2016 Data Breach Investigations Report, Verizon (Mar. 29, 2018, 01:00 PM), http://www.verizonenter-
prise.com/resources/reports/rp_DBIR_2016_Report_en_xg.pdf. 
18  Ibid. 
19  Bruce Schneier, Crypto-Gram, Schneier on Security (Mar. 29, 2018, 01:02 PM), 
https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram/archives/2000/1015.html#1. 
20  Internet Security Threat Report (ISTR) 2018, Symantec (Mar. 29, 2018, 01:04 PM), https://www.syman-
tec.com/security-center/threat-report. 
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they sent carefully crafted emails to Sony employees purporting to be from Apple, de-
manding that they confirm their Apple ID credentials as they had detected unauthorised 
activity. Unwitting employees who clicked on the link in the email were then taken to a 
page resembling account verification pages used by Apple, where they proceeded to enter 
their credentials – data which was collected by the hacking group, who then used these 
stolen credentials to enter the network and upload malware, crippling the system.22 As 
Stuart McClure, former CTO of McAfee, notes, many of those who had their data cor-
rupted and then hard-wired in to the malware that was created had significant access to 
the Sony network.23 The fallout of the breach has been well documented. Hackers ob-
tained: every employee email for the previous 10-year period, including embarrassing 
email traffic between executives and Hollywood stars that were subsequently published 
online; the salaries and personnel records of thousands of Hollywood stars; and several 
unreleased feature films. It also laterally affected other organizations. For example, secret 
acquisitions by the social media organization Snap were made public, having been de-
tailed in the leaked emails.24 The Interview was subsequently pulled by Sony and never 
made it to the big screen.  
 
In addition to the propensity of unaware employees to fall for a spearphishing attack, 
decision making within the organization concerning critical elements of security infra-
structure demonstrates a glaring lack of awareness of, and appreciation for the risk. Deci-
sions are often based on heuristics, or incomplete mental models similar to the program-
mer blind spot referred to above, which try to take a reductionist approach to cyber secu-
rity investment and strategy decisions.25 One example is the ransom payment and cover-
up operation attempted by Uber in the wake of a breach suffered in 2016. Failings in se-
curity infrastructure decision making played a key role in a high-profile breach in 2017 
involving the National Health Service in the UK, which fell afoul of the WannaCry at-
tack. The WannaCry attack was a worldwide self-propagating cyber attack (having the 
ability to spread and cause widespread infection without any user interaction) that ex-
ploited a vulnerability in Microsoft Windows operating system using a hacking tool called 
EternalBlue. While Microsoft had, months in advance, release a patch and notification to 
warn users to repair the vulnerability26, a number of organizations did not heed the warn-
ing, and it was these organizations – from FedEx to various state governments of India - 
	
		
22  Gregg Keizer, Sony hackers targeted employees with fake Apple ID emails, Computerworld (Mar. 29, 2018, 
01:07 PM), https://www.computerworld.com/article/2913805/cybercrime-hacking/sony-hackers-targeted-
employees-with-fake-apple-id-emails.html. 
23  Ibid. 
24  Alex Altman & Alex Fitzpatrick, Everything We Know About Sony, The Interview and North Korea, Time 
(Mar. 29, 2018, 01:08 PM), http://time.com/3639275/the-interview-sony-hack-north-korea/. 
25  Vaibhav Garg & Jean Camp, Heuristics and biases: implications for security design, 32, IEEE TECHNOLOGY 
AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE, 73–79 (2013); see also: Heather Rosoff, Jinshu Cui & Richard S. John, Heuristics 
and biases in cyber security dilemmas, 33, ENVIRONMENT SYSTEMS AND DECISIONS, 4 (2013). 
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that were inevitably affected. For the UK National Health Service, which is publicly 
funded and chronically over-stretched in terms of resources, warnings about the vulnera-
bility caused by running Windows XP operating system – perhaps the most likely oper-
ating system to succumb to an attack that exploited basic weaknesses such as the 
WannaCry attack – were received even before Microsoft issued the patch notification.27 
Once the WannaCry attack spread to the UK National Health Service, more than 70,000 
devices including computers, MRI machines, blood-storage refrigerators and theatre 
equipment was affected and hospitals and trusts across the UK were forced to turn away 
non-critical patients.28 To be sure, this was not a software issue. This was a prime example 
of the impact of human error on the cyber defence posture of an organization. 
 
D. Legal services 
 
Behind every headline-grabbing IPO, market-shaping antitrust dispute, sub-Saharan hy-
dro-electric dam project, and even the commercial aircraft traversing the skies, there are 
law firms undertaking mission-critical work to ensure such projects secure financing, 
comply with regulatory requirements and helping their clients deliver on time and within 
budget. Owing to law firms’ heavy involvement in such matters, and the client rosters 
that firms boast, they inevitably play host to vast troves of crucial commercially sensitive 
information. Law firms also serve to filter out information that is not relevant to a partic-
ular transaction or dispute, in effect honing the information they hold down to only the 
most important. It is little wonder then that law firms have become a prime target for 
hackers in recent years. In 2011, the FBI briefed 200 of the largest US law firms, warning 
them that hackers see attorneys as the back door to valuable client data, and stressed that 
such firms were beginning to experience an uptick in spearphishing attacks.29 This pre-
diction turned out to be startlingly accurate. The opening paragraph of the ABA Tech 
Report on Security 2015 reads: “law firm data breaches are continuing. It was recently re-
ported that at least 80% of the largest 100 law firms, by revenue, have been hacked since 
2011”30. The trend has been mirrored in the UK, with a new report from the National 
Cyber Security Centre noting that 65% of all UK legal services firms have been hacked. 31 
	
		
27  Mark Evans, Leandros A. Maglaras , Senior Member, IEEE, Ying He & Helge Janicke, Human behaviour as 
an aspect of cybersecurity assurance, 9, SECURITY AND COMMUNICATION NETWORKS, 17 (2016). 
28  Amyas Morse, Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS, National Audit Office (Mar. 29, 2018, 
01:13 PM), https://www.nao.org.uk/report/investigation-wannacry-cyber-attack-and-the-nhs/. 
29  Ivan Hemmans & David G. Ries, Cybersecurity: Ethically Protecting Your Confidential Data in a Breach-A-
Day World, American Bar Association (Mar. 29, 2018, 01:14 PM), https://www.americanbar.org/con-
tent/dam/aba/multimedia/cle/materials/2016/04/ce1604lpi.authcheckdam.pdf. 
30  David Ries, Security, American Bar Association Techreport 2015 (Mar. 29, 2018, 01:17 PM), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/techreport/2015/security/Secu-
rity.authcheckdam.pdf. 
31  Cyber threats to the legal sector and implications to UK businesses, National Cyber Security Centre (Mar. 29, 
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While the majority of law firm data breaches go unreported – for reasons we will consider 
later – some breaches have played out on a very public stage. In early 2016, unsealed crim-
inal charges revealed that a small group of Chinese hackers pinpointed 48 prominent UK 
and US law firms with expertise in M&A work for the majority of the Fortune500, in-
cluding Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP and Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP, and subjected 
them to a sustained spearphishing campaign over 3 consecutive months.32 At least one 
employee at two of the organizations targeted inadvertently granted the hackers access by 
clicking on a malware-loaded link in an spearphishing email. Once inside the firms’ sys-
tems, the hackers proceeded to peruse client files and communications relating to at least 
10 ongoing or potential deals. The Financial Times notes that in one particularly success-
ful instance, the hackers obtained information relating to Pitney Bowes’ offer for Bor-
derfree and Intel’s acquisition of Altera and were able to trade ahead of the deals reaching 
fruition, generating approximately $4 million in the process. 33 
 
April 2016 also saw the announcement of what has since been dubbed “the biggest leak in 
data journalism history”, the Panama Papers.34 Here, an internationally operating law 
firm, Mossack Fonseca, was running two websites. One front facing and one acting as a 
client interface, the latter of which shared its IP address with the firm’s email server, which 
itself was running a version of Microsoft Outlook not updated since 2009. This effec-
tively meant that obtaining access to the firm’s already extremely vulnerable email server 
would accelerate access to the firm’s customer interface, thereby unlocking confidential 
client information. When this vulnerability was inevitably exploited, 11.5 million docu-
ments containing 2.6 terabytes of data were exposed, principally detailing the tax affairs 
of high profile figures across the world from Russian oligarchs to the Icelandic prime min-
ister.35 A similar, but unrelated, incident occurred later in 2016, and which was publicly 
disclosed in October 2017, when major offshore firm Appleby, was breached in an “illegal 
computer breach”36, believed to have been carried out using similar techniques to those 
deployed in the Panama Papers breach. In this instance, 13.4 million documents compris-
	
		
32  United Strates of America vs. Iat Hong, Bo Zheng & Chin Hung, United States District Court Southern 
District of New York (Mar. 29, 2018, 01:23 PM), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/press-re-
lease/file/921006/download. 
33  Brooke Masters, Lawyers and accountants are prime targets for cyber attacks, Financial Times (Mar. 29, 2018, 
01:26 PM), https://www.ft.com/content/f52f6fee-ccf4-11e6-864f-20dcb35cede2. 
34  Barb Darrow, How Tech Made the Pulitzer Prize-Winning Panama Papers Coverage Possible, Fortune (Mar. 
29, 2018, 01:27 PM), http://fortune.com/2017/05/30/panama-papers-data-tools/. 
35  Offshore Leaks Database, The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (Mar. 29, 2018, 01:07 
PM), https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/. 
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ing 1.4 terabytes of data were obtained and published, exposing the tax workings of com-
panies such as Nike and Apple, as well as high profile figures such as F1’s Lewis Hamilton 
and the Queen of England. 37 
 
"Consider litigators unable to access motions on a deadline. Trial lawyers preparing for 
arguments without key documents. Transactional lawyers unable to communicate with 
clients attempting to close multibillion-dollar deals".38 This was reality for global heavy-
weight DLA Piper in June 2017 when the firm fell victim to the Petya attack, another 
aggressively self-propagating attack similar to the earlier WannaCry attack, which also ex-
ploited vulnerabilities in Microsoft operating systems. Interestingly, experts noted that 
the malware used in the attack was not designed to make money, but instead to spread 
fast and cause damage.39 While DLA Piper may not have been held to ransom, the damage 
caused to the firm by way of disruption of its global operations nevertheless caused sig-
nificant financial damage. With an estimated 24 hours without phones, 2 days with no 
access to email and up to 6 weeks without full access to previous emails and other docu-
ments, not to mention the lasting reputational damage that comes with such a high-pro-
file breach, it is not surprising that this ‘disaster’ is likely to end up costing the firm mil-
lions in lost earnings.40 
 
Cyber attacks are not reserved for only large law firms. Information presented in the ABA 
Tech Report 2016 demonstrates that while 26% of firms with 500 or more attorneys, and 
20% of firms with 100 or more reported successful data breaches in 2015, 25% of firms with 
between 10 and 49 attorneys and 8% of solo practitioners reported successful breaches 
over the same period.41 When one considers that of the 1,300,705 practicing attorneys in 
2015, 45% were solo practitioners and only 16% comprised of firms with 100 or more at-
torneys, it becomes clear that private practice entities of all sizes are under attack.42 For 
	
		
37  The Long Twilight Struggle Against offshore Secrecy, The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists 
(Mar. 29, 2018, 01:32 PM), https://www.icij.org/investigations/paradise-papers/. 
38  Roy Storm, Ransomware Attack on DLA Piper Puts Law Firms, Clients on Red Alert, The American Lawyer 
(Mar. 29, 2018, 01:33 PM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/almID/1202791614770/Ransomware-At-
tack-on-DLA-Piper-Puts-Law-Firms-Clients-on-Red-Alert/. 
39  Iain Thomson, Everything you need to know about the Petya, er, NotPetya nasty trashing PCs worldwide, The 
Register (Mar. 29, 2018, 01:35 PM), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/06/28/petya_notpetya_ransom-
ware/. 
40  https://blog.barkly.com/dla-piper-petya-ransomware-attack; See also: Barney Thompson, DLA Piper still 
struggling with Petya cyber attack, Financial Times (Mar. 29, 2018, 01:38 PM), https://www.ft.com/con-
tent/1b5f863a-624c-11e7-91a7-502f7ee26895. 
41  David Ries, Security, American Bar Association Techreport 2016 (Mar. 29, 2018, 01:41 PM), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/techreport/2016/security/secu-
rity.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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example, in addition to major law firm data breaches referred to above, QBE, a UK insur-
ance company, in a piece with the Financial Times disclosed 150 incidences of successful 
‘Friday fraud’ whereby hackers had learned that UK property lawyers tended to close deals 
on Fridays and move money between accounts. Hackers proceeded to gain access to firms’ 
email servers via spearphishing campaigns, and once inside, send emails from the server 
pretending to be the lawyer on the file for that particular transaction and direct closing 
monies to be transferred to a particular bank account. The claims manager of QBE is 
quoted as saying “anyone with half a brain could carry out these sorts of email scam … 
high street conveyancing firms are not necessarily going to have the latest data security 
systems”. The company estimates that upward of £85 million was stolen over an 18-month 
period from 2015. This also serves to highlight that there is now a broader spectrum of 
perpetrators of attacks which range from government-funded hacking groups, such as the 
Chinese group behind the Canadian Seven Sisters law firm breach in 201043, to non-tech-
savvy individuals who can buy and distribute malware that even comes with a money-
back guarantee should the programme be caught by antivirus systems. 
II. PART 2 – THE LAW FIRM CYBER SECURITY QUAGMIRE 
 
While all industries that handle valuable data are subject to increasing levels of cyber at-
tack, there is a set of inter-related factors in the law firm cyber security ecosystem that 
makes law firms more susceptible to attack and also serves to prevent such firms from 
taking action to counteract attack vulnerability. As a result of the inter-related external 
and internal factors affecting law firm cyber security, the human element of firm security 
infrastructure has been neglected, thereby making humans, at once law firms’ greatest as-
set, their main cyber security weakness.44 There has been some movement of late, and 
regulators and clients alike are right to demand law firms do more to improve their cyber 
security posture.45 However, much of the scrutiny to which their conduct has been sub-
jected has tended to overlook the complexities of the law firm cyber security quagmire, 
and unless these issues are addressed in the context of a potential solution, meaningful 
change is not likely. What follows is an analysis of current issues concerning law firm cyber 
security and how these, together, create human vulnerabilities ranging from increased sus-
ceptibility to spearphishing attempts to a complete lack of awareness of good cyber prac-
tice generally, that have the potential, when exploited, to cripple a firm’s IT infrastruc-
	
		
43  Jeff Gray, Hackers linked to China sought Potash deal details: consultant, The Globe and Mail (Mar. 29, 2018, 
01:37 PM), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/technology/tech-news/hackers-linked-to-china-sought-pot-
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44  Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, The Relational Infrastructure of Law Firm Culture and Regulation: The Exag-
gerated Death of Big Law, 42, HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW 109 (2013). 
45  Julie Sabowale, Law firms must manage cybersecurity risks, American Bar Association Journal (Mar. 29, 2018, 
01:47 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/managing_cybersecurity_risk; See also: McNer-
ney, Michael & Emilian Papadopoulos, Hacker's Delight: Law Firm Risk and Liability in the Cyber Age, 
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ture, jeopardize client information, and negatively affect reputational capital in the pro-
cess. 
 
A. The buyer’s market for legal services 
 
Commentators such as Ribstein46 and Galanter and Henderson47 make the point that the 
information asymmetry that once existed between law firm and client and was the “bread 
and butter”48 of large law firms’ reputational capital, which enabled firms to demand high 
fees, has now been eroded. This is due to in-house legal teams becoming larger and more 
sophisticated, and because of the variety of service providers on offer in the market, from 
other law firms to legal technology companies. Clients now have less need to purchase 
legal services based on personal relationships or sole-provider agreements with traditional 
firms and are empowered to shop around for the best fit for their particular needs.49 It is 
true to say that we now find ourselves in a buyer’s market for legal services, where clients’ 
have more control than ever when it comes to who is providing the service and on what 
terms. Law firms face unprecedented competition from competitor firms, new techno-
logically-enabled entrants and alternative business model (ABS) providers.50 This shift to-
wards a buyer’s market for services was accelerated by the Great Recession and has since 
seen in-house teams commanding greater bargaining power while operating within 
tighter budgetary constraints and demonstrating an increased willingness to unbundle 
work and source it to the most cost-efficient provider. The knock-on effect for traditional 
law firms is that they have been forced to adapt quickly, or face forfeiting market share. 
In order to do so, as well as being more receptive to fixed and alternative fee arrangements, 
law firms have enthusiastically championed a culture of round-the-clock availability to 
clients, made possible by remote mobile devices51, and have begun to engage legal process 
outsourcing and artificial intelligence tools as part of an efficiency and innovation drive.52 
 
While law firms have benefitted greatly from modern technological developments, a dis-
parity exists between the hyper rate at which law firms are adopting new technologies and 
the level of competence of their security infrastructure, which greatly increases the risk of 
cyber attacks. One example is with regard to smartphones. The ABA Tech Report 2016 
	
		
46  Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW, 749 (2010). 
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Law Firm, MAURER SCHOOL OF LAW: INDIANA UNIVERSITY (2008). 
48  Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, The Relational Infrastructure of Law Firm Culture and Regulation: The Exag-
gerated Death of Big Law, 42, HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW 109 (2013). 
49  Ibid. 
50  The Future Of Legal Services, The Law Society (Mar. 29, 2018, 01:48 PM), https://www.lawsoci-
ety.org.uk/news/documents/future-of-legal-services-pdf/. 
51  Eli Wald, Legal Ethics’ Next Frontier: Lawyers and Cybersecurity, 19, CHAPMAN LAW REVIEW 501 (2016). 
52  Ibid; See also McNerney, Michael & Emilian Papadopoulos, Hacker's Delight: Law Firm Risk and Liability 
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notes that 93% of lawyers use a smartphone for work outside of the office, and only 43% 
of lawyers reported having a mobile technology policy for their firm, meaning that most 
firms do not have a policy for how mobile devices should be used or client data transmit-
ted or stored on them.53 As McNerney and Papadopoulos point out, “client relations re-
quire near-constant accessibility to attorneys and online access to important documents 
that might otherwise stay secured in the office”.54 While adequate for meeting modern 
client availability demands in this way, remote connected devices without robust security 
measures also “means easier access to sensitive information for adversaries and creates op-
portunities for hackers to enter onto corporate networks by breaking into remote systems 
or compromising mobile devices”.55 
 
B. Lack of regulatory scrutiny and effective ethics rules 
 
In the United States, most state-level legislation requires law firms to notify clients if they 
reasonably believe a third party has gained unauthorized access to their data, and federal 
laws apply to particular industries, imposing data security requirements which may apply 
to lawyers operating within that industry.56 47 states have enacted data breach notifica-
tion statutes which require private entities to notify affected individuals of data breaches 
compromising their information. The regulations, however, vary wildly as regards which 
entities must comply, the definition of breach, the definition of reasonable and notifica-
tion requirements. In the absence of an established federal-level standard of law firm cyber 
regulation, states have promulgated their own rules. However, few legal standards apply 
to law firm data breaches, and those that do, such as an obligation to notify clients if one 
reasonably believes there has been a data breach compromising client information, come 
with little by way of guidance. This precipitates imprecise and inconsistent interpretation, 
thereby stifling enforcement.57 In the UK, the situation is somewhat more straightfor-
ward in terms of the regulatory framework, but similar issues persist, particularly regard-
ing notification requirements. Under the Data Protection Act 1998, which is enforced by 
the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), the Seventh Principle stipulates that ‘ap-
propriate technical and organizational measures shall be taken against unauthorised or 
unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or dam-
age to, personal data,’ mandating the implementation of some form of cyber defence by 
law firms. While in the United States there is a basic requirement in most states to notify 
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affected clients of data breaches (which is seldom enforced for reasons explained above), 
there is no legal obligation to report breaches which result in loss, release or corruption of 
client data under the UK regime.58 
 
Wald highlights the consequences that a lax regulatory environment for law firm cyber 
security conduct has had for the ability for market controls – such as action by clients (e.g. 
firing and/or suing their legal service provider) – to have an impact. Law firms are under 
no general duty to report attacks or breaches to clients and often have insufficient infor-
mation about such attacks or breaches to allow for comprehensive reporting to clients in 
any event. He notes that “a plaintiff in a malpractice lawsuit must establish four elements: 
the existence of a duty, breach of the duty owed, causation, and damages. Yet a plaintiff 
in a malpractice suit alleging negligence in failing to protect information is unlikely to be 
able to prove damages because of the challenges in answering key questions about cyber 
security breaches: who perpetrated the cyber attack; what information did they steal; what 
is the value of that information to them or others; and what other harms, such as opera-
tional disruption, competition, or reputational damage, resulted for the victim? Conse-
quently, there are hardly any cases litigating attorney (or even corporate) negligence for 
failure to protect confidential information”.59 That is, of course, if the client is even told 
about the breach in the first place. Wald refers to this issue as the ‘underregulation’ of law 
firm cyber security conduct, or “the inability of clients to effectively utilize liability rules 
and market controls to ensure that lawyers face appropriate cyber incentives.”60 He goes 
on to emphasise that “as lawyers face insufficient incentives to implement appropriate 
cyber security measures and report attacks to clients, data about attacks and their conse-
quences goes uncollected, diminishing the prospect of effective liability rules and market 
controls developing in the future. This is the kind of market failure that is unlikely to 
resolve itself without regulatory intervention, except that liability rules are not likely to 
constitute an effective regulatory response. It is also the kind of market failure that pre-
vents the collection of the very data we need to better understand the extent of the prob-
lem we are facing.”61 
 
Ethics rules, while having a potentially important role to play in improving law firm cyber 
security conduct should they be upgraded to account for failings in the current regulatory 
landscape, do little to improve the situation at present. The ABA Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct have been revised in recent years to take account of the permeation of 
technology throughout the practice of law and to acknowledge the increased risk of cyber 
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attacks on law firms. In particular, new Rule 1.6(c) states that “[a] lawyer shall make rea-
sonable efforts to prevent . . . the unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, 
information relating to the representation of a client,” and is accompanied by Comments 
18 and 19 for guidance on interpretation. However, Wald makes the point that efforts to 
enable ethics rules to fill the void left by fragmented state and federal law firm cyber secu-
rity regulations fall short of the mark.62 The Rule and Comments fail to require law firms 
to put in place a cyber security plan to monitor cyber defences for breach, do not provide 
guidance on what constitutes “reasonable efforts” and “reasonable precautions”, and stop 
short of mandating disclosure requirements to clients regarding breaches which concern 
client data.63 In the UK, lawyers are under an obligation contained in the Solicitor’s Reg-
ulatory Authority’s Code of Conduct 2011 to protect client confidentiality. In particular, 
Outcome (4.5) stipulates that law firms have effective systems and controls in place to 
enable them to adequately identify risks to client confidentiality and to mitigate those 
risks, and Indicative Behaviour (4.1) requires that “your systems and controls for identi-
fying risks to client confidentiality are appropriate to the size and complexity of the firm 
or in-house practice and the nature of the work undertaken, and enable you to assess all 
the relevant circumstances”. Yet interestingly a recent CenturyLink white paper concern-
ing law firm cyber security in the UK puts forward that only 1% of all complaints received 
by the SRA are in relation to data security.64 This serves to reinforce Wald’s point that 
the uncertainty surrounding cyber attacks on law firms – who perpetrated the attack, 
what information was compromised, and what damage, if any, did clients suffer as a result 
of the attack - which persists because of uncollected data owing to underregulation, ren-
ders liability and market controls ineffective means of regulating lawyers’ cyber security 
conduct.65 
 
C Changes in the regulatory environment and client demands 
 
The introduction of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in May 2018 in-
troduces far more stringent regulatory standards and obligations on firms to protect data.  
The GDPR will apply not only to organizations within the EU, but also organizations 
located outside the EU if they offer services to EU data subjects. With over 100 US law 
firms located in London alone, the majority of which have European entities on their re-
spective client lists, it is clear that the GDPR is an initiative with global reach. Obligations 
under the GDPR include mandatory breach notification reporting to the relevant na-
tional regulatory body (e.g. the UK ICO) within 72 hours and ‘privacy by design’ which 
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involves implementing appropriate security measures with regard to systems and person-
nel, and introducing policies and procedures governing data management by staff. 66 
Much has been made of the penalties which can be levied against organizations found to 
breach provisions of the GDPR. A non-compliant firm could face a fine of €20 million 
or 4% of turnover, whichever is greater. This is doubtless a positive development, and it 
will be interesting to observe the impact it has on law firm cyber conduct. In-light of the 
above issues concerning the collection of data on law firm cyber incidents and the issues 
faced by law firms in identifying breaches in the first place, there is reason to be sceptical. 
The concern is that law firms will adopt the bare minimum standard of compliance 
within the realms of their perceived regulatory threat level, which is arguably lower than 
average organization given the enigmatic nature of law firm cyber security data. However, 
Article 24 of the GDPR, which concerns the implementation of appropriate technical 
and organizational measures to protect information, also requires affected organizations 
to demonstrate compliance with the GDPR. With a recent report highlighting that ap-
proximately 25% of UK based law firms believing themselves to be compliant with the 
provisions of the GDPR, it is true to say that law firms, at a minimum, will be subjected 
to increased regulatory scrutiny under the GDPR, the above scepticism notwithstanding. 
It may well be the case that national regulatory bodies turn to use the GDPR in an at-
tempt to force better law firm cyber security – time will tell. 
 
With respect to ethics rules, Wald has made clear that the recent revision of the ABA Rules 
of Professional Conduct – particularly Rule 1.6(c) and accompanying Comments 18 and 
19 stop short of being an effective means of mandating better cyber security in the fact of 
inadequate liability rules and market pressure. He advocates for a further revision of the 
Rules to require stronger cyber protections within law firms, provide for mandatory 
breach disclosure requirements to clients, and delineation on the meaning of ‘reasonable’ 
in the context of cyber protections and disclosure requirements upon breach.67 While it 
is agreed that the “promulgation of robust rules of professional conduct” concerning se-
curity protection in law firms and data breach reporting to clients would in theory incen-
tivise law firms to take action, such radical overhaul – which would need to be an inter-
nationally co-ordinated effort on behalf of national regulatory authorities in order to af-
fect globally operating law firms – is not immediately on the horizon.68 
 
In addition to the - albeit piecemeal - movements taking place with regard to the regula-
tory environment and ethics rules concerning law firm cyber security, clients too are be-
ginning to exert market pressure on their legal service providers. The ABA Tech Report 
on security 2016 suggests that increased pressure from clients – who are themselves exam-
ining their cyber security posture and that of their supply chain – is causing firms to focus 
on cyber risk. 62.8% of law firms with 500 or more and 30.7% of all law firms reporting 
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that actual or prospective clients had provided them with security requirements.69 We 
know little about the actual figures, however. Some initial research in to law firms in the 
United States suggests that 40% of firms intend to increase their cyber security spend 
somewhat in 201870, but aside from this, data remains opaque. Liability rules may also 
inform law firm cyber conduct, notwithstanding the potential issues with compliance 
highlighted above. Firms which stand accused of poor cyber conduct may simply settle 
with the affected client instead of having the issue played out in public, which could stand 
to harm both organizations71. Such settlement serves as a form of damage limitation, 
whereby the firm may pay compensation to an affected client and, in the worst case, lose 
that client’s business, but crucially, information about the breach is kept private in order 
to protect the firm’s reputation. 
 
A potentially important development came by way of a class action suit brought in the 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in April 2016, when a client sued its 
law firm, not for damage resulting from breach, but because their technology systems 
were not up to “industry standards”, leaving open the possibility that client data could be 
jeopardised should the firm’s systems be breached.72 While the dispute was eventually ar-
bitrated, meaning that all further information remained private, the initial complaint was 
unsealed by the court in December 2016. This is interesting for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, it demonstrates a willingness on behalf of a client to take a proactive approach to 
enforcement of malpractice liability further upstream than what is usually associated with 
a malpractice suit. Second, it highlights the effectiveness of the use of alternative dispute 
resolution provisions in retainers as a means of keeping malpractice issues relating to client 
information out of public view, meaning that it is likely that data regarding law firm cyber 
security breaches and disputes will continue to go uncollected. The likely consequence is 
that there will persist little by way of judicial exposition of aspects of malpractice suits 
emanating from law firm cyber security conduct, such as what is ‘reasonable’ in the con-
text of firm’s cyber security protections or data breach disclosure requirements to clients, 
even if we do see an uptick in malpractice actions. 
 
Recent cyber security incidents involving law firms such as the DLA Piper hack and the 
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Panama and Paradise Papers, which implicated Mossack Fonseca and Appleby respec-
tively, have highlighted what we already know about attacks on law firms, according to 
Wald. We know law firms are aggressively being targeted, we know more about the type 
of hackers and why they are attacking law firms. Firms even know more about how to 
protect themselves from such attacks and how to mitigate damage caused. Importantly, 
however, we are still none the wiser as to whether law firms are actually acting on this data 
to improve cyber defences and thereby protect client information.73 
 
D The law firm partnership model, PEP success and reliance on the billable hour 
 
As with the original Cravath model, large law firm success continues to be underpinned 
by time-based billing and billable hour budgets today. The billable hour has itself raised 
a range of issues since its inception, from the impact that billable hour culture has on law-
yers’ health, morale and work-life balance to the proposition that it actually tends to re-
ward inefficiency and other unethical practices.74 As Parker and Ruschena note, the jun-
ior lawyers of today in large law firms are under the strong and consistent impression that 
the value of their work is judged based on the fees they generate in the form of billing and 
when faced with an employer whose goal is revenue generation for the partners, non-part-
ner lawyers may feel a disconnect in-terms of loyalty to the firm, precipitating issues such 
as unethical behaviour in relation billing practices and de-motivation regarding firm ini-
tiatives.75 The core decision making of the firm is controlled by the inner-circle of equity 
partners, who also control access to key clients. Molot notes that because an equity part-
ner’s stake vanishes upon retirement, his/her only real reward for partnership is the an-
nual draw on profits during productive years at the firm, meaning they are ill-equipped 
to make long-term investment decisions in the firm and have a decidedly short-term 
bias.76 Law firm partnerships can therefore be said to be short-termist by nature and be-
cause firms are obsessed with current comparative performance metrics such as the 
‘profit-per-equity-partner’ (PEP) marker of success, by which firms are ranked against 
competitors, there is a clear and definite focus on maximizing profits.77 
 
This also serves to reinforce a point alluded to earlier with respect to the changing nature 
of the profession toward a buyer’s market for services: that there now exists a culture of 
24/7 availability to clients, enabled by remote devices. Lawyers are effectively always con-
nected to the network, and by consequence there is optimal opportunity to generate more 
fees by way of billing. Molot argues that this development has served to alienate lawyers 
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and clients alike. The, now 24/7, billable hour model serves to maximize current profits, 
thereby boosting a firm’s PEP standing, but leaves clients feeling deeply dissatisfied. 
Firms’ have the wrong financial incentives to do the work and clients also feel overcharged 
due to inherent inefficiencies of their work practices, while lawyers themselves feel over-
worked and undervalued.78 
 
‘Autonomous self-interest’ – seeking to maximize one’s own atomistic good without re-
gard for others - has replaced ‘relational self-interest’ – prioritising the inter-relatedness of 
actors and that maximization of self-interest cannot occur in isolation - as the dominant 
culture of the legal profession. This has served to undermine both the economic and pro-
fessional conduct of firms.79 Galanter and Henderson highlight a further impact of this 
new model, which is particularly relevant for our purposes: “notwithstanding its formi-
dable size, the 'firm’ itself has remarkably little autonomy to pursue noneconomic objec-
tives, such as … the training and mentoring of the next generation of lawyers. Although 
the partnership shares the benefits of successful recruitment, the lack of credible risk shar-
ing reduces the willingness of individual lawyers to invest in firm-wide initiatives that do 
not simultaneously optimize their own practice”.80 
 
We would add that in an autonomous self-interest culture where partners often strive to 
‘own’ their client relationships and ‘eat what they kill’ in terms of maximising their own 
profits based on those ‘owned’ relationships, there is often a perverse incentive for infor-
mation hiding and for keeping things from the rest of the partners and the firm. This in-
turn can lead to riskier and often unethical practices that are often not visible at Firm level. 
Furthermore, due to law firms’ lack of permanent equity, current equity partners, or the 
decision making core of the firm, have little incentive to invest in projects that are long-
term in nature, such as investments in firm IT and infrastructure, as it is likely the benefits 
of such investment will be seen also in the long term – perhaps after the particular part-
ners charged with making such decisions have retired or moved on to pastures anew. This 
is despite, as Molot notes, corporate finance literature being replete with evidence that 
short-termism does not, in fact, serve to maximize returns for equity stakeholders.81 
 
E The product of short-termism and underregulation combined 
 
Short-termism, coupled with the underregulation of cyber security conduct, has created 
a plethora of negative consequences that characterise the current internal law firm cyber 
security environment. Issues such as the lack of investment in IT and infrastructure pro-
jects has severely limited firms’ ability to implement adequate cyber security protections, 
	
		
78  Ibid. 
79  Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW, 749 (2010). 
80  Henderson William D. & Galanter Marc, The Elastic Tournament: The Second Transformation of the Big 
Law Firm, MAURER SCHOOL OF LAW: INDIANA UNIVERSITY (2008). 
81  Jonathan T. Molot, What’s Wrong with Law Firms? A Corporate Finance Solution to Law Firm Short-
Termism, 88, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 1 (2015) 
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while a culture of 24/7 availability to clients enabled by remote connected devices in-
creases vulnerability. In any event, given the absence of effective liability rules and market 
pressure, law firms are not being forced to change. It is true to say that law firms are taking 
steps to improve their cyber defences, given the current threat environment. Improving 
software protections such as firewalls appears to be the obvious first step, but some firms 
have also moved to tackle the human element of cyber security with awareness campaigns 
such as ‘Cyber Security Month’, spearphishing penetration testing (where test spearphish-
ing emails are sent to staff and responses recorded), and corporate training exercises such 
as tutorials and accompanying exercises. Additionally, some lawyers, as Wald notes, may 
respond to peer pressure and organically evolving security norms within firms.82 How-
ever, these approaches are inadequate to deal with the persistent and systematic problems 
caused by law firm short-termism and underregulation generally, but especially the most 
important aspect of cyber defence - humans. The current approach adopted by law firms 
means that staff, from administrative staff to partners, are fundamentally under-skilled 
and unprepared to guard against cyber attacks. 
 
It has been true for some time that cyber security is more a human issue than an IT issue.83 
Improving cyber security conduct therefore necessitates behavioural change on behalf of 
those within the organization. Such change is a painstaking and slow process, requiring 
persistent effort and monitoring over time to adjust a current feedback loop to fit the 
desired behaviour. 84  A short tutorial video, an awareness campaign, or standalone 
spearphishing penetration testing will not achieve such change. In a recent conversation 
with the Chief Information Officer of a major UK law firm, the authors learned that the 
average annual time spent training lawyers within the organization was as little as 8 
minutes per year - presumably the length of the mandatory tutorial video and question-
naire, and this was predicted to be the same across the majority of large UK law firms. It 
has also been well documented that awareness campaigns do not affect behaviour when 
it comes to cyber security. Analogous data is provided by Evans et al, with respect to the 
healthcare industry in the UK. The authors note that the National Health Service was 
successfully breached across its various organizations over 7000 between 2011 and 2014, 
with an increase in the number of breaches of 101% between 2013 and 2014, all despite 75% 
of such organizations receiving standard security awareness material over the same pe-
riod.85 Finally, spearphishing penetration testing, while perhaps one of the more effective 
means of monitoring firm cyber security vulnerability to attack, can do little beyond mon-
itoring if not accompanied by regular training in order to affect meaningful behavioural 
change. This is a development in law firm cyber defence that has been hamstrung by the 
	
		
82  Eli Wald, Legal Ethics’ Next Frontier: Lawyers and Cybersecurity, 19, CHAPMAN LAW REVIEW 501 (2016). 
83  The Human Factor in IT Security: How Employees are Making Businesses Vulnerable from Within, Kaspersky 
Daily (Mar. 29, 2018, 02:06 PM), https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/the-human-factor-in-it-security/. 
84  Shari Lawrence Pfleefger & Deanna D. Caputo, Leveraging Behavioural Science to Mitigate Cyber Security 
Risk, 31, COMPUTERS & SECURITY 4 (2012). 
85  Mark Evans, Leandros A. Maglaras , Senior Member, IEEE, Ying He & Helge Janicke, Human behaviour as 
an aspect of cybersecurity assurance, 9, SECURITY AND COMMUNICATION NETWORKS, 17 (2016). 
	
	
COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |    VOLUME 4   NUMBER 1   2018 
DAVID O’DONOVAN & ALEXANDRA MARSHAKOVA  |  OVERCOMING THE SECURITY QUAGMIRE: BEHAV-IOURAL SCIENCE 
AND MODERN TECHNOLOGY HOLD THE KEY TO SOLVING THE COMPLEX ISSUE OF LAW FIRM CYBER SECURITY 
 
PAGE  48 
billable hour culture, as firms fail to reconcile effective and regular cyber security training 
with 24/7 availability to clients. 
 
As we have seen, lawyers unskilled to deal with, and unaware of the dangers of, cyber 
attacks are the greatest threat to a law firm’s security, with many large data breaches in 
recent years – such as DLA Piper and Appleby – emanating from spearphishing cam-
paigns. The impact of such breaches was exacerbated by the lack of a clear cyber security 
policy or response plan within the individual firm. In addition to the above issues of 
short-termism and underregulation being contributing factors to cyber security issues 
which persist in law firms, an underlying issue that plays a key role in lawyers’ susceptibil-
ity to attack is their personality type. Research by Halevi, Memen and Nov has demon-
strated that conscientious personality types are far more susceptible to spearphishing than 
other personality types.86 Conscientiousness is associated with being stable, trustworthy, 
thorough, analytical and factual – key personality and skills traits of lawyers. The study 
found that “while conscientiousness people are hardworking and have high self-control 
… an appeal to efficiency and order will overcome the participants self-control and raise 
the likelihood of responding to a spear-phishing attack”.87 The study also showed a nega-
tive correlation between respondents’ perceived risk of attack versus their actual suscepti-
bility to attack, thereby demonstrating that not only are conscientious types more vulner-
able to attacks, they actually underestimate the likelihood of falling victim to an attack.88 
This underlying behavioural weakness is doubtless amplified by the current issues of law 
firm short-termism and the underregulation of law firm cyber security conduct. 
 
It should be noted that the consequences of inadequate training are not just limited to 
failing to spot attacks, however. They extend to dangerously ignorant cyber security con-
duct by personnel online. A recent report released by RepKnight in January, which stud-
ied the dark web footprint of the 500 biggest UK law firms, showed that over 1 million 
leaked, hacked or stolen credentials – including firm email address and password combi-
nations (80% of the credentials) – were available for sale on the dark web. That is an av-
erage of 2,000 credentials per firm, and at least 1 from every firm. What is most worrying 
about this development, notwithstanding the sheer size of the confidential data available, 
is that most of said data was obtained from third-party breaches, or breaches unconnected 
to the firm itself. This means that lawyers had been using their work credentials to sign 




86  Tzipora Halevi, Nasir Memon & Oded Nov, Spear-Phishing in the Wild: A Real-World Study of Personality, 
Phishing Self-Efficacy and Vulnerability to Spear-Phishing Attacks, SSRN (Mar. 29, 2018, 02:14 PM), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2544742. 
87  Ibid. 
88  Ibid. 
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Lack of investment also means that firms are understaffed in terms of specialist IT per-
sonnel to manage cyber risk. Large law firms, especially those spoken to by the authors, 
operate with small teams of between 4 and 10 cyber risk professionals, severely curtailing 
their ability to affect cultural change within such large organizations. An interesting con-
sequence of this, which to a large extent is explained by the organizational environment 
of law firms, is that legal and IT teams operate in silos almost completely disconnected 
from each other. Legal teams or departments are characterised by autonomous self-inter-
est, prioritising the team instead of the firm as the collective in the pursuit of revenue 
maximization by way of billing, and the IT team is so small that it is a rare occurrence for 
the legal team to ever have sight of them, beyond their 8-minute yearly compliance video, 
of course. At present, IT and cyber security matters are delegated to the IT or IT Risk 
team, who fix the matter and enable the lawyer to get back to work, with little or no inte-
gration or information sharing between the teams. When the IT team attempt to intro-
duce new measures, they are likely to meet resistance on budgetary and personnel fronts. 
For example, the implementation of new cyber security systems can entail considerable 
expense and the time spent training-in personnel on such systems (or time not spent bill-
ing) would be hard to recover.90 Additionally, the introduction of security measures such 
as limiting access to networks or mandating frequent password changes, or the implemen-
tation of internal cyber security policies intended to improve conduct within legal teams 
are likely to be perceived as cumbersome, time-consuming and intrusive for lawyers and 
therefore are less likely to be followed.91 Wald refers to these as ‘Holmesian bad people’, 
or those who will attempt to get away with not implementing appropriate cyber security 
measures owing particularly to an acute awareness of the underregulation of law firm 
cyber security conduct.92 
III. PART 3 – THE SOLUTION 
 
A The inadequacy of the current approach to training 
 
It should now be clear that law firm cyber security, while in need of drastic improvement, 
faces significant challenges in order to overcome the inter-related complexities that have 
curtailed such improvement over time before any real progress can be made. Law firms 
are moving to shore up cyber defences, but current approaches revolve around software 
protection, spearphishing penetration testing, inadequate and expensive cyber risk insur-
ance, awareness alliances, sponsored seminars and formal tick-box compliance training for 
minutes per year. None of these approaches are effective at impacting the human behav-
iour aspect of cyber security defence, as is clear by the mounting evidence of continued 
cyber breaches experienced by law firms and lack of appreciation for cyber risk in lawyers’ 
	
		
90  Alex Blau, The Behavioral Economics of Why Executives Underinvest in Cybersecurity, Harvard Business Re-
view (Mar. 29, 2018, 02:17 PM), https://hbr.org/2017/06/the-behavioral-economics-of-why-executives-under-
invest-in-cybersecurity. 
91  Eli Wald, Legal Ethics’ Next Frontier: Lawyers and Cybersecurity, 19, CHAPMAN LAW REVIEW 501 (2016). 
92  Ibid. 
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online behaviour, all attributable to human error. These protections represent the best 
and the most extensive in the legal profession at present. 
 
As outlined earlier, the most effective means of attack is spearphishing. A recent FireEye 
whitepaper highlights that the most effective means of preventing spearphishing is to first 
and foremost, “train users to recognise, avoid and report suspicious emails”; second is to 
“maintain and update security technology and processes to prevent, detect and respond 
to ever-evolving spear-phishing threats” and thirdly striving “to stay ahead of attackers by 
investing in actively updated threat intelligence and expertise to meet their needs”.93 The 
second and third elements of this strategy pose an issue owing to the short-termist nature 
of law firms, aversion to investment and the difficultly of overhauling systems for globally 
operating firms. However, the first issue is by some way the most crucial but also the most 
troublesome for law firms. Effective means of training employees to deal with spearphish-
ing requires persistent testing backed up with context-specific educational training so that 
employees are regularly educated as to the dangers of spearphishing, know how to detect 
an attack and what to do when they suspect one, and their susceptibility to attack is con-
stantly tested to promote vigilance and defence skills development94. Training is the most 
important element of defence against spearphishing primarily because it builds skills and 
awareness to deal with attacks if and when a firm’s software defences are penetrated. Ad-
ditionally, training and awareness are crucial in establishing the foundations of a culture 
of good cyber practice, with such skills and awareness positively permeating throughout 
the organization and subsequently impacting the investment decisions of the partnership. 
A recent report by PhishMe highlights the importance of such training. They note that 
training employees to spot and report spearphishing emails reduced the average time it 
took to detect a breach from 146 days to 1.2 hours.95 In its absence, the partnership is likely 
to compartmentalise IT and infrastructure spend (including training) as just another 
budgetary consideration, without the added consideration that such a business risk war-
rants. Law firms are doubtless aware of the need for such training, and yet it is has almost 
no prominent role to play within the organization. The reality of short-termism has 
meant that, for law firms, hourly billing and 24/7 availability to clients and such training 
are perceived to be mutually exclusive. This consideration also holds true for the other 2 
elements of the FireEye whitepaper, with firm-wide IT infrastructure updates likely to be 
perceived as disruptive and precipitate further lost time. In the face of underregulation of 







93  Best Defense Against Spear Phishing, FireEye (Mar. 29, 2018, 02:19 PM), https://www.fireeye.com/current-
threats/best-defense-against-spear-phishing-attacks.html. 
94  Ibid. 
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B Cause for improvement 
 
Arguments abound as to why law firms need to improve cyber security defences. We have 
noted some key reasons above: attacks are increasing in quantity and complexity; breaches 
are becoming more common and more high-profile; the impending introduction of the 
GDPR; clients are demanding a certain standard of cyber protection at the beginning of 
the relationship; data privacy and data stewardship awareness and perception are becom-
ing much more commonplace; there is a prospect of malpractice suits by aggrieved clients 
for lax cyber security practices and breach of fiduciary duty to protect information. Fur-
thermore, a successful breach that plays out on the public stage will serve to erode a firm’s 
reputation. For example, in 14 March 2018, Mossack Fonseca – the firm implicated in the 
Panama Papers – announced that it was to shut down at the end of the month, citing the 
“reputational deterioration” that occasioned “irreversible damage” on the firm. 96 We 
would also add that strong cyber defence capability now has key differentiating potential 
in an ultra-competitive buyer’s market for legal services. While law firm cyber security is 
underregulated, the conduct of their clients, for the most part, is not and carries with it 
enormous non-compliance costs. For example, organizations in the financial services and 
healthcare sectors are subject to strict data security laws, which are destined to become 
more-so upon the introduction of the GDPR this year. Such organizations are under an 
obligation to require their supply chain to attain a certain level of cyber security protec-
tion in order to comply with provisions of the GDPR. If law firms can demonstrate ade-
quate cyber defences when compared to competitors, during the pitch process for exam-
ple, their chances of being perceived favourably by prospective clients who see cyber secu-
rity as a critical business risk, are likely to be substantially higher than firms with weaker 
cyber defences. Firms typically need to show that they have technical expertise, geograph-
ical reach, project management protocols and tools to accurately control scope, cost and 
timing, but now also need to ensure and demonstrate that client information will be sub-
ject to the highest standards of information security. Incredibly, should a law firm be in a 
position to demonstrate the 3 elements of spearphishing protection detailed in the FireEye 
whitepaper, they would be perceived as market-leading in terms of cyber security protec-
tions. As Wald notes 96% of attacks employ simple techniques, such as spearphishing, 
and yet 97% of attacks can be blocked entirely by the use of common cyber security de-
fence practices that are entirely within reach of law firms today. Such approaches comprise 
of the technological and human alike: “using current virus scanners and firewalls, in-
stalling patches and updates, using cryptographically strong passwords, avoiding risky 
software downloads from the Internet, eschewing the use of public cloud providers or file 
sharing services for sharing documents, avoiding the use of web-based e-mail services and 
public Wi-Fi, replacing the default passwords on network hardware, and training employ-




96  Reuters Staff, Panama Papers law firm Mossack Fonseca to shut down after tax scandal, Reuters (Mar. 29, 
2018, 02:21 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-panama-corruption/panama-papers-law-firm-mossack-
fonseca-to-shut-down-after-tax-scandal-idUSKCN1GQ34R. 
97  Eli Wald, Legal Ethics’ Next Frontier: Lawyers and Cybersecurity, 19, CHAPMAN LAW REVIEW 501 (2016). 
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C. A human problem – insights from behavioral science 
 
The technological protections described by Wald are a must, and to a large extent, already 
exist in law firms today. The human protections are significantly more important. Given 
that the vast majority of data breaches (95%) involve some aspect of human error, it is clear 
that cyber security is a human problem that requires a human solution, with effective 
training being the most critical component of the passport to success. But how do law 
firms reach this promised land, given the complex and crippling effects of short-termism 
and underregulation? To be sure, fundamental tenets of good cyber defence posture will 
inevitably require investment on behalf of the partnership – in-terms of systems and per-
sonnel, and also the implementation and enforcement of stringent cyber security policies, 
in a coordinated effort by legal and IT teams working together. It is our contention that 
the most important aspect of law firm cyber defence for our purposes – training employ-
ees to deal with spearphishing – which is a crucial defence mechanism in its own right, 
but also serves to underpin the likely success of such other aspects as policy development 
and enforcement within legal teams, does not require a dismantling of the short-
termism/underregulation conundrum in order to arrive at a workable solution. Instead, 
what is needed is a change in how such training is perceived and delivered. The current e-
learning approach to spearphishing training in law firms (a video tutorial and ‘click next’ 
test) is a concept first introduced in the late 1990s98, and is in dire need of updating. Ad-
ditionally, we note that some law firms have now made regular spearphishing penetration 
testing part of their defence protocol. The common approach is to send employees a sus-
picious email to their work email address and record the response, i.e. whether the recipi-
ent clicks on a link contained in the email, marks the email as spam, or ignores the email. 
One such email that one of the authors received while working for a large UK law firm 
related to the establishment of a mentoring scheme sponsored by Amazon, whereby Am-
azon customers who are professionals would sign up to mentor school children and other 
children from youth organizations in their community. The email immediately raises sus-
picion. The author concerned did not have an Amazon account set up with the firm’s 
email, and there was therefore no reason for Amazon to send an email to this address, and 
so the email was duly marked as spam. Later, in a conversation with the Chief Information 
Officer of the firm (the same conversation where the authors uncovered the 8 minutes 
per year training figure), we learned that the spearphishing test sent to the majority of 
employees in the London office tricked 42% in to clicking on the bogus link in the email. 
Interestingly, spearphishing awareness information was circulated to those respondents 
that clicked on the link in the initial test, and when the test was repeated 1 week later with 
a different template, 75% of those respondents again clicked on the link. This serves to 
reinforce the point that spearphishing penetration testing, while an effective means of 
gauging vulnerability to spearphishing attack at any given time, is not effective at devel-
oping the skills and awareness needed to adequately defend against attack if not supported 
and reinforced by effective training with an element of duration. 
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Daniel Solove sums up the need for a change in training methodology as follows: “Secu-
rity is complicated because it essentially requires each employee to act with a high level of 
awareness and vigilance, a state that is hard to sustain.  Over time, corners tend to get cut 
more, busy people tend to do more careless things, practices tend to become sloppy.  
That’s human nature.  Complacency sets in.  Being on one’s toes isn’t an easy state to 
maintain. These problems are best addressed through training.  Merely showing people a 
PowerPoint or putting them through a program that’s the equivalent to an airline safety 
video is a waste of time.  People must be engaged.  They must care.  And the message must 
be repeated over and over and over.  People aren’t robots, after all.  They forget quickly … 
The fact is, cyber security training is vastly undercapitalized, and the lack of investment 
in quality cyber education programs is manifest in the sheer volume of breaches that con-
tinue to be rooted in human failure … To be clear, technology is a critical piece of the 
cyber security puzzle, but just as with a car containing all the latest safety technology, the 
best defence remains a well-trained driver”.99 
 
Appeals to employee engagement and incentivising them to care about security are 
themes rooted in the behavioural science work of Nobel Economics laureate Dr Richard 
Thaler and before him Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky.100 Dr Thaler’s work with 
Cass Sunstein on ‘nudging’, improving behaviour by arranging choice architecture with-
out removing an individual’s freedom of choice, has important application for cyber se-
curity within organizations. Thaler and Sunstein make the point that an organization’s 
policies are predicated on the principle that its people do not intentionally behave irra-
tionally and yet we fail to recognise our own biases, even if we consider ourselves to be 
completely rational. At work we don’t always do the things that might improve our or-
ganization’s security.101 
 
The concept that nudging can improve organizational cyber defence has been adopted by 
the UK Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI), who have issued 
guidance to organizations on how to improve security defences, underpinned by the ‘5Es’ 
framework: educate employees on why threats exist, the form they take and why they are 
vulnerable; enable employees to demonstrate the cyber defence skills expected of them; 
shape the environment to make it easier to demonstrate good cyber defence skills; encour-
age action by providing feedback to employees to encourage good cyber defence behav-
iour and skills development while highlighting errors and discouraging undesired actions 
	
		
99  Daniel Solove, Cybersecurity vs. Humans: The Human Problem Requires a Human Answer, TeachPrivacy 
(Mar. 29, 2018, 02:23 PM), https://teachprivacy.com/cybersecurity-vs-humans-human-problem-requires-hu-
man-answer/. 
100  Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 47, THE ECOMET-
RIC SOCIETY 263-292 (1979). 
101  Philip Ebert & Wolfgang Freibichler, Nudge Management: Applying behavioural science to increase knowledge 
worker productivity, 6 JOURNAL OF ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 4 (2017); See also: RICHARD H. THALER & 
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and behaviours; and evaluate the impact on employee behaviour by tracking progress in 
skills development as against the time and resources committed to improving defence 
skills. 102  The guidance also highlights the importance of endorsement from credible 
sources in the organization’s hierarchy such as C-suite executives as crucial to supporting 
the success of the framework.103 Pfleeger and Caputo make the point in their survey paper 
which illustrates that leveraging behavioural science theory in establishing a defence infra-
structure by catering for such elements as cognitive dissonance104, the bystander effect105 
and confirmation bias106, leads to clear improvements in employee cyber defence skills 
and awareness as well as an overall improvement in the effectiveness of organizational 
cyber defence. They note “most efforts to improve cyber security focus primarily on in-
corporating new technological approaches in products and processes. However, a key el-
ement of improvement involves acknowledging the importance of human behaviour 
when designing, building and using cyber security technology”.107 
 
D. Heads-up: A new approach to training using aspects of modern technology 
 
The question remains: how can law firms move to a model that allows for effective 
spearphishing defence skills development and also establish the key foundations of a cul-
ture of good cyber security behaviour generally without detracting from lawyers’ availa-
bility to clients or disrupting their work environment, which would negatively impact 
billable targets. We contend that modern technological innovations, when applied to cur-
rent training methodologies to deal with spearphishing, have a key role in developing a 
realistic solution to the issue of spearphishing training in law firms. This, in-turn, allows 
	
		
102  Embedding Security Behaviours: using the 5Es, Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (Mar. 29, 
2018, 02:25 PM), https://www.cpni.gov.uk/system/files/documents/98/dc/Embedding-Security-Behaviours-
Using-5Es.pdf. 
103  Ibid. 
104  Cognitive dissonance is the feeling of discomfort that comes from holding two conflicting thoughts in the 
mind at the same time. Cognitive dissonance is central to many forms of persuasion to change beliefs, values, 
attitudes and behaviours. To get users to change their cyber behaviour, we can first change their attitudes about 
cyber security. For example, a system could emphasize a user’s sense of foolishness concerning the cyber risks 
he is taking, enabling dissonant tension to be injected suddenly or allowed to build up over time. Then, the 
system can offer the user ways to relieve the tension by changing his behavior. 
105  The bystander effect is a psychological phenomenon in which someone is less likely to intervene in an emer-
gency situation when other people are present and able to help than when he or she is alone. During a cyber 
event, users may not feel compelled to increase situational awareness or take necessary security measures be-
cause they will expect others around them to do so. Thus, systems can be designed with mechanisms to counter 
this effect, encouraging users to take action when necessary. 
106  Once someone takes a position on an issue, she is more likely to notice or give credence to evidence that sup-
ports that position than to evidence that discredits it. Users may have initial impressions about how protected 
(or not) the information infrastructure is that they are using. To overcome their confirmation bias, the system 
must provide users with an arsenal of evidence to encourage them to change their current beliefs or to mitigate 
over-confidence. 
107  Shari Lawrence Pfleefger & Deanna D. Caputo, Leveraging Behavioural Science to Mitigate Cyber Security 
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for realistic behavioural change over time and the establishment of a key component of 
effective law firm cyber defence infrastructure without infringing on the constraints im-
posed by short-termism and underregulation. It is important to note this is not an abstract 
or theoretical solution suggested by the authors in light of the above analysis. This tech-
nology is already being applied to create non-disruptive, behavioural science-based 
spearphishing training, with real solutions available to organizations on the market to-
day108. The approaches adopted by companies such as Cofense, Wombat and Fissure Se-
curity purport to upgrade the current standard of spearphishing training, which at pre-
sent consists of sporadic spearphishing penetration testing, educational tutorials and the 
circulation of awareness material, which has little impact on employee cyber security be-
haviour and competence. These organizations propose continuous, non-disruptive train-
ing, as well as behavioural analytics to arrive at a scenario where employees can be tested 
and trained to improve cyber defence and awareness 24/7 and be provided with accurate 
feedback on their progress, while also maintaining availability to clients 24/7, as such 
training does not necessitate employees being removed from their normal work environ-
ment and is instead integrated with their work routine. 
 
Such training involves a combination of i) spearphishing penetration testing in the form 
of distributing fictitious quick-action spearphishing emails (short context specific email 
containing a link or attachment) and using data analytics to track responses, and ii) an 
overlay on employees’ computer screens that runs when the email application such as 
Outlook is open, and provides subtle but clear indicators of spearphishing (e.g. drawing 
users’ attention to the email address, reminding users to consider whether any links in the 
email re-direct to an external website, and whether any attachments are referred to or de-
scribed in the email or that the email and its attachments were expected by the user). These 
indicators or pockets of information, such as ‘Security Tips’, are displayed on screen but 
in a non-disruptive manner (e.g. small info boxes or coloured indicators in the margins of 
emails) and also do not require interaction in the form of ‘click-to-agree’ in order to avoid 
click fatigue. This training is then continually reinforced with regular spearphishing train-
ing emails (similar to the spearphishing penetration testing referred to above) which 
would target a particular aspect of spearphishing to test employees. Employees are tasked 
with reporting suspicious emails and rewarded with positive automated feedback should 
their detection be accurate. Those who fail the spearphishing penetration test receive au-
tomated feedback on why they failed and what to look out for next time, again in a non-
disruptive manner. This method becomes all the more effective when employees are 
aware of the training and that they are likely to receive test emails skills feedback at any 
given moment. The net effect is that employees are always on the look-out for suspicious 
emails and adopt a ‘report-in-any-case’ default position. This is a response promoted by 
the perception that an employee may fail the test and receive negative feedback, a reaction 
	
		





COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |    VOLUME 4   NUMBER 1   2018 
DAVID O’DONOVAN & ALEXANDRA MARSHAKOVA  |  OVERCOMING THE SECURITY QUAGMIRE: BEHAV-IOURAL SCIENCE 
AND MODERN TECHNOLOGY HOLD THE KEY TO SOLVING THE COMPLEX ISSUE OF LAW FIRM CYBER SECURITY 
 
PAGE  56 
explained by fear appeal and protection motivation theory.109 Nobody wants to fail a test 
and receive negative feedback, especially not high-conscientious and highly-competitive 
lawyers. Furthermore, with the overlay running on real work emails in addition to 
spearphishing test emails, employees are constantly having their skills of detection 
topped-up. Add to this the circulation of context-specific awareness material about vari-
ous aspects of cyber security threats, and the likelihood of catching a real attempt at 
spearphishing increases dramatically. 
 
The application of technology with respect to the overlay in this context is best described 
with reference to airline pilots’ heads-up displays: “As the key source of information for 
pilots, the human visual system has necessarily driven much of the evolution in cockpit 
technology. In contrast to the complicated, gauge-based systems of the past, the electronic 
flight displays of today’s modern airliners are testament to advances in human factors en-
gineering. The next step in flight instrumentation, although already used for some 50 
years in the military, is just beginning to emerge in civil transport aircraft. Head-up dis-
plays (HUD) allow pilots to see key flight instrumentation while viewing the outside 
world. The need to look down at the flight instruments is removed by the HUD, resulting 
in increased situational awareness and greater precision in aircraft control …The primary 
flight displays of modern transport aircraft do an excellent job of presenting information 
to pilots in a way that promotes efficiency and good situational awareness. However, the 
need to transition from the use of head-down displays to outside visual reference at cer-
tain points in the flight continues to create an attentional division, often during critical 
management periods. The use of HUD brings primary flight management information 
and outside visual reference into the same visual scene, increasing the usefulness and rele-
vance of displayed symbology”.110 
 
Training such as this, which helps employees identify aspects of an attack; gives them an 
opportunity to report suspicious emails; receive demonstrable feedback on their cyber de-
fence competence level; and regularly tests for weaknesses in order to reinforce good cyber 
defence skills and awareness certainly holds promise for law firms. This is especially so 
because the training can be conducted consistently over any desired period of time or for 
as long as it takes for a clear improvement in cyber defence competence and behaviour 
and is done so on a non-disruptive basis and within lawyers’ normal work environment. 
This, it is argued, circumvents the issues caused by law firm short-termism, such as the 
billable hour culture and 24/7 availability to clients, but also can bring a positive change 
to the issue of underregulation of law firm cyber security conduct. Firms that can demon-
strate effective cyber defence of their personnel can use this to win new clients who have 
set requirements high for cyber security standards of their supply chain, and also bolster 
existing client relationships for the same reason. 
	
		
109  Sebastian Schuetz, Paul Benjamin Lowry and Jason Thatcher, Defending Against Spear-Phishing: Motivating 
Users Through Fear Appeal Manipulations (June 27, 2016). 20th Pacific Asia Conference on Information Sys-
tems (PACIS 2016), Chiayi, Taiwan, June 27–July 1. 
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Training such as this, which helps employees identify aspects of an attack; gives them an 
opportunity to report suspicious emails; receive demonstrable feedback on their cyber de-
fence competence level; and regularly tests for weaknesses in order to reinforce good cyber 
defence skills and awareness certainly holds promise for law firms. This is especially so 
because the training can be conducted consistently over any desired period of time or for 
as long as it takes for a clear improvement in cyber defence competence and behaviour 
and is done so on a non-disruptive basis and within lawyers’ normal work environment. 
This, it is argued, circumvents the issues caused by law firm short-termism, such as the 
billable hour culture and 24/7 availability to clients, but also can bring a positive change 
to the issue of underregulation of law firm cyber security conduct. Firms that can demon-
strate effective cyber defence of their personnel can use this to win new clients who have 
set requirements high for cyber security standards of their supply chain, and also bolster 
existing client relationships for the same reason.111 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
As Wald notes, stopping all cyber attacks is impossible to do. Yet, 96% of hacking attacks 
employ simple techniques, and 97% of attacks can be blocked by common security prac-
tices that are within the reach of even small law firms and solo practitioners. Chief among 
these common cyber security practices is training employees to recognize deceptive at-
tacks, known as spearphishing.112 Law firms face unprecedented danger from cyber attack 
owing to the increase quantity, quality and diversity of attacks and attack sources, and are 
also more vulnerable to attacks, presenting a ‘lower hanging fruit’ to hackers, in terms of 
size of the prize (and therefore potential liability costs to law firms) vs. effort to break in, 
than organizations in other industries. While it is true that law firms need to do more to 
protect client information, the issue is far more complicated than first appears. Law firm 
cyber defence has been stymied by a mix of short-termism and underregulation of cyber 
security conduct, which manifests itself in the form of external factors, including lax reg-
ulatory standards and ethics rules as well as non-existent client pressure, and internal fac-
tors, such as the partnership model and PEP marker of success which is underpinned by 
the billable hour. We have outlined that as well as a recent spate of high-profile law firm 
data breaches, there is a regulatory shift is underway with the introduction of the GDPR 
and an incoming wave of future, similarly inspired measures around data protection in 
the Digital era and also a change in client attitudes toward protection of their confidential 
information, meaning that law firms are now under pressure to improve defences. We 
have made clear that while law firms traditionally have been unable to train employees to 
deal with spearphishing owing to the requirements of the billable hour and culture of 
24/7 availability to clients, modern technological innovations hold the potential to up-
date spearphishing training methodologies to both address and dramatically improve the 
	
		
111  McNerney, Michael, and Emilian Papadopoulos. "Hacker's Delight: Law Firm Risk and Liability in the Cyber 
Age." American University Law Review 62, no.5 (2013): 1243-1272. 
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human behaviour aspect of cyber defence through skills and awareness development, and 
also be non-disruptive in-terms of delivery, allowing lawyers to stay in their normal work 
environment and maintain availability to clients. However, this is only one aspect of an 
effective cyber defence infrastructure. A collective effort is needed on behalf of all person-
nel within law firms – lawyers and non-lawyers, at every level of the hierarchy, to imple-
ment and manage a comprehensive governance framework that promotes good, proac-
tive, cyber security practice that permeates the firm’s culture. Effective training that caters 
for the human aspect of cyber defence by comprising behavioural science principles and 
which can be delivered within the present constraints of law firm short-termism and un-
derregulation, coupled with the development, implementation and enforcement of effec-
tive cyber security policies and procedures are the first steps in establishing the founda-
tional aspects of good cyber practices and defence competence. A culture of sustainable, 
incentive-aligned cyber security embedded into everyday practice, fit for the digital age 
law firm. 
